TURKISH CENTER  for ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES

NATO’s Annual Leaders’ Summit was held in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, at a time of significant geopolitical and geoeconomic uncertainty on a global scale. Since its founding in 1949, NATO has navigated numerous turning points and shifted its strategic priorities to adapt to changing global dynamics.

NATO’s Evolution: From 1.0 to 3.0

NATO’s history can be divided into distinct phases. The era of NATO 1.0 encompassed the Cold War years, during which the alliance functioned primarily as a collective security organization countering the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s marked a strategic success for NATO and signaled the end of the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War period, NATO transitioned to what can be called NATO 2.0. During this phase, the alliance shifted its focus from traditional military and security policies to the democratization of Eastern European countries and their integration into NATO. Former Warsaw Pact members became NATO allies, and the organization expanded its identity to include regional and global political cooperation. This period also saw previously anti-Western countries emerge as partners in a new era of economic globalization and multilateralism.

Russia’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program was a symbolic dismantling of Cold War legacies. Cooperation between NATO and Russia progressed relatively smoothly until the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. Particularly after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent Russia-Ukraine crisis, which led to the suspension of NATO’s strategic partnership with Moscow. By the time the Russia-Ukraine War erupted in 2022, Russia was once again perceived as a primary security threat to NATO.

The transition to NATO 3.0 began during the 2008 global financial crisis and continued through the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, culminating in the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War. This period brought several critical developments that reshaped NATO’s strategy. First, Russia was re-established as a direct security threat. Second, NATO members increasingly identified China’s economic rise and growing global influence as a potential challenge. However, consensus among NATO members on whether to view China as a rival or partner remains elusive.

A significant challenge to NATO 3.0 is the growing divide between the United States and its European allies over defense spending. While the Biden administration temporarily set aside this issue to focus on the Russia-Ukraine War, the debate over burden-sharing resurfaced during President Trump’s second term.

Assessments of the Ankara Summit

The 2026 NATO Ankara Summit was held amidst these internal and external challenges, making its outcomes particularly significant.

One of the summit’s most notable accomplishments was the attendance of all NATO member state leaders, despite tensions within the alliance. This was particularly significant given President Trump’s repeated criticisms of European members for not increasing their defense budgets and relying disproportionately on U.S. security guarantees. Trump had even hinted at the possibility of the U.S. leaving NATO, making his participation in the summit a reaffirmation of the alliance’s importance.

The summit also saw the participation of non-member NATO partners, including the presidents of Azerbaijan, South Korea, Ukraine, Syria, and the European Union, as well as foreign or defense ministers from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. This broad participation underscored NATO’s efforts to strengthen global partnerships.

Progress was highlighted in defense investments. In 2025, European allies and Canada allocated $139 billion to core defense spending. Now they pledged an additional $50 billion for capabilities such as surveillance systems, drones, air platforms, and long-range weaponry. Commitments were made to expand manufacturing, innovation, and supply chains, signaling progress toward reducing NATO’s dependence on the United States. NATO framed these efforts as advancing "NATO 3.0," with a stronger Europe playing a more significant role within the alliance.

Support for Ukraine remained a central focus, with NATO pledging approximately €70 billion in military equipment, training, and assistance for 2026. Commitments were made to sustain similar levels in 2027, reinforcing NATO’s long-term support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia.

Indo-Pacific Engagement

The summit also addressed the interconnectedness of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. NATO continued its engagement with the Indo-Pacific Four (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand). However, participation from these partners at the Ankara Summit was lower-profile compared to previous years. Discussions highlighted growing linkages between the regions but did not yield major new agreements or elevate the status of these partnerships.

While the official Ankara Summit Declaration did not mention China, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte accused Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang of enabling Russia’s war in Ukraine. China’s Foreign Ministry rejected these accusations, criticizing NATO’s "Cold War mentality" and urging the alliance to abandon its global expansionist ambitions towards the Asia-Pacific.

Shortcomings and Disagreements

The dispute between Turkey and Greece over maritime issues in the Aegean Sea is not merely a bilateral problem between Ankara and Athens but also undermines NATO's southeastern flank in Europe. During the Ankara Summit, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis expressed concerns, stating that Greece perceives Turkey as a threat and opposes Ankara’s acquisition of fifth-generation fighter jets like the F-35. Greece also objects to Turkey’s reentry into the F-35 program and its procurement of advanced military technologies and defense industry products, not only from the United States but also from other leading NATO members.

Another contentious issue involving Greece, Turkey, and occasionally the EU, is Cyprus. Although the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) is not a NATO member, it plays a critical role in regional security policies. As an EU member, the Republic of Cyprus, alongside Greece, opposes Turkey’s access to the EU’s defense industry fund, SAFE. Ankara does not officially recognize the Republic of Cyprus and instead recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as the sole legitimate authority on the island. Turkey strongly opposes the Republic of Cyprus’s potential NATO membership.

The Cyprus issue is particularly complex, with implications that go beyond Turkey and Greece to affect the broader security structure of the Eastern Mediterranean. The persistent disagreements over Cyprus, coupled with the maritime disputes, continue to strain NATO's cohesion in the region and complicate efforts to strengthen its southeastern flank.

One of the most significant crises leading up to the Ankara Summit was the lack of support from NATO countries for a joint U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran. U.S. officials repeatedly raised this issue, expressing frustration over the absence of allied backing. However, other NATO allies argued that the operation was a unilateral action carried out without prior consultation. As a result, European allies and Canada maintained that issues with Iran, including its nuclear program, should be addressed through diplomatic negotiations rather than military intervention.

During the Ankara Summit, tensions between the United States and Denmark over Greenland resurfaced, particularly at the outset of the summit, when President Trump reiterated his earlier views on acquiring Greenland and its potential sovereignty transfer to the United States. This raised concerns not only in Denmark but also within NATO, as it sparked fears of a potential new rift within the alliance.

Turkey’s Role as Host

In an environment marked by increasing divisions within the alliance and growing uncertainties regarding NATO’s future direction, the successful convening of the Ankara Summit with the full high-level participation of member states can be regarded as a diplomatic success for Turkey as the host nation. Ankara utilized the summit as a platform to negotiate and position itself as a central player in NATO's evolving security architecture, referred to as NATO 3.0. Although the decisions reached at the Ankara Summit were largely principle-based, the absence of any major crises during the event was a noteworthy achievement for Turkey in its role as host.

Turkey’s robust defense industry infrastructure provides significant opportunities for both NATO 3.0 and the future security architecture of Europe. Throughout the summit, Ankara consistently emphasized its commitment to contributing to NATO and European defense initiatives, as well as its willingness to cooperate in these areas.

During the summit, President Trump’s statement expressing full support for Turkey’s removal from CAATSA sanctions and its reinstatement into the F-35 program was received positively by Ankara. However, these outcomes are unlikely to materialize immediately without concrete actions being taken. A key unresolved issue remains the transfer of Turkey’s Russian S-400 air defense missile systems to a third country, which is one of the primary conditions for lifting the sanctions. At this juncture, Ankara seeks to resolve the S-400 issue without jeopardizing its relations with Moscow.

Potential destinations for the S-400 systems have reportedly included Azerbaijan, Qatar, the UAE, and the Turkish military base in Somalia. Ankara is working toward a conciliatory resolution with Moscow to address this matter. While such an approach might appear contradictory, it is plausible given the Trump administration’s relatively constructive relationship with the Putin administration.

Nonetheless, the Trump administration will need to leverage its influence in the U.S. Congress to lift sanctions against Turkey and facilitate Ankara’s return to the F-35 program. Without such efforts, the likelihood of Congress approving favorable decisions for Turkey on these issues remains relatively low.

All in all, the Ankara Summit concluded without major crises but left significant challenges unresolved. NATO members reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance, emphasizing its importance despite internal disagreements. 

The 2026 NATO ANKARA SUMMIT: A Turning Point for NATO 3.0?

Selçuk Çolakoğlu

Turkish Center for Asia-Pacific Studies  - July 12, 2026